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WHY LAND TENURE REFORM IS THE KEY TO 
POLITICAL STABILITY IN TONGA 
Kersti Harter Kennedy† 
Abstract: The Kingdom of Tonga, a South Pacific country, erupted in violent pro-
democracy riots in late 2006 after decades of political unease.  Tonga’s people are 
divided into two main classes:  the nobles and the commoners.  These two classes have 
long differed in political and land rights in a hierarchy that is typical of chiefdoms such as 
Tonga.  Tonga’s government has attempted to deal with the sometimes violent, 
commoner-led pro-democracy movement by amending its Constitution to allow 
commoners to vote for more of the members of the Legislative Assembly.  The resulting 
government and the noblemen have not, however, shown a commitment to land reform in 
favor of commoners, and it is unlikely that the recent amendments will result in changes 
to the land tenure system.  In Tonga, the rising population and declining land productivity 
within a context of insecure land rights have prompted individuals to engage in conflict 
with the government and nobility, both of which have become less powerful.  
Evolutionary ecology predicts this result, and, in conjunction with insights from 
economics, is also a fertile approach for finding solutions to political instability.  This 
comment argues that only extensive land reform will likely end political violence in 
Tonga.  It suggests changes in the Constitution and the Land Act to end or reduce the 
nobles’ power over commoner lands, to allow for more commoners to occupy land, and 
to improve the productivity of commoner lands.  These changes would require Tongans 
to place individual liberties above some cultural traditions. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On December 22, 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
praised the Kingdom of Tonga for “taking another step toward democracy” 
through its unprecedented election, in which the nation’s commoner class 
voted for a majority of the Legislative Assembly members.1  Secretary 
Clinton’s sentiment has since been echoed, with many Westerners 
applauding Tonga’s efforts at achieving democracy.2 
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  For example, the U.S. State Department has been especially supportive of Tonga’s political 
reforms:  “I applaud the Tongan government for promoting democracy through political reforms and 
preserving the balance of power enshrined in your Constitution.”  Victoria Nuland, The Kingdom of 
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In the shadows of the warm reception, however, lurks the possibility 
of continued political violence like the 2006 riots.  On November 16, 2006, 
pro-democracy rioters destroyed much of the capital of Nuku‘alofa, 
targeting government- and elite-controlled property.3   
The government ultimately responded to the violence by increasing 
the number of commoner representatives in the Legislative Assembly.4  
Commoners comprise a majority of Tonga’s population of over 100,000 
people,5 while there are only thirty-three nobles.6  Commoners and nobles, 
however, used to have nine representatives each in parliament,7 even though 
commoners outnumbered nobles in population.  In November 2009, a 
Constitutional committee recommended introducing a parliament in which 
commoners would choose a majority of the members.8  The amended 
Constitution did away with an assembly that the powerful noblemen had 
previously dominated.9  In November 2010, the election under the new 
Constitution finally took place.10 
 In light of Tonga’s history, the de jure changes to Tongan law were 
revolutionary.  Tonga is the last remaining monarchy in the South Pacific,11 
and though a constitutional monarchy, it has functioned more like a 
dictatorship, with the king or queen controlling the government.12  Although 
never formally colonized, Tonga became a British protectorate in 1901 but 
remained autonomous in its domestic affairs; in 1970, it became fully 
independent.13  The Tongan monarchy and nobility have thus been 
paramount in the country’s governance, even through the protectorate 
period. 
                                                                                                                              
Tonga’s Constitution Day, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (Nov. 3, 2011), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/176613.htm.  
3
  See Tongan Riots After Reforms Delay, BBC NEWS, Nov. 16, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6153238.stm.  
4
  See Audrey Young, Tongans Ready to Vote Under ‘Ordinary Peoples’ Constitution, N.Z. 
HERALD, Nov. 25, 2010, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10689869.   
5
 See Tonga, WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS—GOOGLE PUBLIC DATA EXPLORER, 
http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=sp_pop_totl&idim=country:TON
&dl=en&hl=en&q=tonga%27s+population (last visited Feb. 10, 2012). 
6
  MARTIN DALY, TONGA: A NEW BIBLIOGRAPHY 9 (2009). 
7
  See id. 
8
  CONSTITUTIONAL AND ELECTORAL COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, 115 (Nov. 5, 2009), available at 
http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/special/cec_final_report.pdf [hereinafter CEC FINAL REPORT].  
9
  See Young, supra note 4. 
10
  Id. 
11
  GEORGE E. MARCUS, THE NOBILITY AND THE CHIEFLY TRADITION IN THE MODERN KINGDOM OF 
TONGA 2 (The Polynesian Society, Inc. 1980) (1978). 
12
  See DALY, supra note 6, at 9. 
13
  JERRY DUPONT, THE COMMON LAW ABROAD 1215, 1216-18 (2001). 
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The monarchy and nobility’s control of much of the population is not 
surprising considering Tonga’s ecology.  The country’s population is dense, 
owing to its successful agricultural intensification.14  This population is 
spread over three main island groups in the South Pacific between Fiji and 
New Zealand.15  Tonga has long been a “chiefdom,”16 which can be defined 
as “an autonomous political unit comprising a number of villages or 
communities under the permanent control of a paramount chief.”17  
Chiefdoms commonly appear in circumscribed island environments where 
competition for resources is fierce.18   
Tonga transitioned legally to a constitutional monarchy in 1875,19 but 
the hierarchy of the chiefdom has largely remained and will likely continue, 
even with the Constitutional amendments.  The monarchy and nobles will 
probably work to keep the land tenure system of the chiefdom intact because 
competition over land continues to grow, and the social and legal hierarchy 
of the chiefdom ensures that those in charge can control land use and access.  
The pro-democracy movement and the 2006 riots indicate that commoners 
are ready to change the system, with violence if necessary.  
Human behavioral ecology (“HBE”),20 a theoretical branch of 
evolutionary anthropology, provides possible long-term solutions to Tonga’s 
instability, because it looks at root causes of human conflict.  This comment 
uses evolutionary ecological theory, in conjunction with insights from 
economics, to argue that insecure land rights, rising population, and 
declining land productivity, combined with the decreasing power of the 
nobles, has led to the recent commoner uprising and pro-democracy 
movement.  Further, although the Tongan government has attempted to solve 
its instability problems by increasing political representation for commoners, 
the recent amendments are unlikely to change land laws.  Therefore, 
instability will continue until Tonga reforms its land laws and policies or 
makes extensive political reforms ultimately resulting in land tenure 
                                           
14
  Shankar Aswani & Michael W. Graves, The Tongan Maritime Expansion: A Case in the 
Evolutionary Ecology of Social Complexity, 37 ASIAN PERSP. 135, 143 (1998). 
15
  DALY, supra note 6, at 1. 
16
  Aswani & Graves, supra note 14, at 144. 
17
  Robert L. Carneiro, The Chiefdom: Precursor of the State, in THE TRANSITION TO STATEHOOD IN 
THE NEW WORLD 37, 45 (G. D. Jones & R. R. Kautz eds., 1981) (defining “chiefdom”). 
18
  Id. at 64. 
19
  DALY, supra note 6, at 9. 
20
  HBE is defined as “the evolutionary ecology of human behaviour.  Its central focus is how the 
behaviour of modern humans reflects our species’ history of natural selection.”  Monique Borgerhoff-
Mulder, Human Behavioural Ecology, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE SCIENCES 1, 1 (2003). 
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changes.  The proposed changes require Tongans to place individual liberties 
above some cultural traditions.  
The remainder of this comment supports this thesis.  Part II provides 
the legal and historical background leading up to the pro-democracy 
movement.  Part III examines the Tongan government’s attempts to deal with 
instability by modestly changing the structure of the Legislative Assembly.  
Part IV argues that, to stabilize Tonga and quell future violence, the 
government must reform its land laws and policies.21  Working within the 
current governmental framework, this comment offers several possibilities 
for amending the Constitution and the Land Act to end or reduce the nobles’ 
power over commoner lands, to allow for more commoners to occupy land 
and to create new policies to improve the productivity of commoner lands.  
This comment addresses the problem of political violence, which Tongans 
recognize and ostensibly want to solve, but it argues that the adopted 
solution is insufficient.  It therefore takes a consequentialist perspective to 
legal and policy reforms, though the changes prescribed may accord with 
deontological perspectives as well.  Those who applaud Tonga for its 
growing acceptance of “democracy” should keep in mind that Tonga is not 
only far from being a free society, but also that the nation must make 
extensive reforms before achieving its goal of stability. 
II. TONGAN LAW MAINTAINED A DISPARITY BETWEEN COMMONER AND 
NOBLE RIGHTS, BUT THE PRO-DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT DEMANDED 
CHANGE 
As mentioned in Part I, pre-Constitutional Tonga was a chiefdom with 
an inegalitarian political system.  The Constitution of 1875, and later, the 
Land Act, reduced the nobility’s power and respected commoner rights 
somewhat, but the commoner-noble distinction remained largely intact.  The 
pro-democracy movement reacted to this disparity, eventually ushering in 
the recent Constitutional reforms.  Subsections A and B detail Tongan law 
and history related to land and political rights before the 2009 amendments 
in two main stages:  1) before and 2) after the Constitution of 1875.  
Subsection C then explains how the pro-democracy movement and riots 
encouraged the 2010 changes.  This part discusses law in a broad sense, 
                                           
21
  When discussing land reform, this comment uses a broader definition to include reforms that seek 
to increase the ability of commoners to access land and secure their rights in it, rather than simply 
redistributive reforms.  See Roy L. Prosterman & Tim Hanstad, Land Reform in the Twenty-First Century: 
New Challenges, New Responses, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 763, 763 (2006). 
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viewing the customary legal system of pre-Constitutional Tonga as equally 
as legal as the laws of Constitutional Tonga.22 
A. Pre-Constitutional Tonga Was a Chiefdom Wherein Commoners Had 
Few Rights 
Humans have lived in Tonga for around 3,000 years.23  Most of the 
Tongan islands stretch over 300 square kilometers of the South Pacific, and 
are bunched into the four groups of Tongatapu, Ha‘apai, Vava‘u, and 
Niuatoputapu.24  Tonga has a dense population due to its extensive and 
successful agriculture.25 
Tonga’s population density induced an ancient battle for control of the 
islands.26  Large monuments appeared around 1000 C.E., suggesting a power 
struggle among chiefs resulting in the advertisement of chiefly abilities.27  
By the eighteenth century C.E., the four island groups were politically 
integrated into the Tongan chiefdom.28  A monarch has ruled this expanding 
chiefdom beginning as early as 950 C.E., when the first Tu‘i Tonga king is 
believed to have lived.29  Local chiefs controlled smaller social units, and 
their seniority depended on their relationship to the sacred Tu‘i Tonga.30  As 
mentioned before, this type of polity is called a “chiefdom.”31 
The precise nature of commoner rights in the chiefdom is unclear, 
with different scholars reaching different conclusions.  Earlier scholars 
“depict chiefs as having a rather despotic domination over commoners,” 
whereas later researchers characterize the relationship between the classes as 
                                           
22
  One evolutionary legal scholar has defined law as “all rules that are necessary to a stable society.   
All law that is meant to keep a society stable can be called law, even if it results in the suffering of 
members of society.”  HENDRIK GOMMER, A BIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW: NATURAL LAW THEORY 
REVISITED 35 (2011). 
23
  Aswani & Graves, supra note 14, at 142.  
24
  Id. at 140. 
25
  Id. at 143. 
26
  See id. at 143-44. 
27
  Id. at 143; see generally Geoffrey Clark, David Burley & Tim Murray, Monumentality and the 
Development of the Tongan Maritime Chiefdom, 82 ANTIQUITY 994 (2008) (discussing Tongatapu’s 
megalithic tombs and their link to the expansion of the Tongan chiefdom).  
28
  Aswani & Graves, supra note 14, at 143-44. 
29
  MARCUS, supra note 11, at 6 n.5. 
30
  Kerry James, Right and Privilege in Tongan Land Tenure, in LAND, CUSTOM AND PRACTICE IN 
THE SOUTH PACIFIC 157, 160 (R. Gerard Ward & Elizabeth Kingdon eds., 1995). 
31
  See Carneiro, supra note 17, at 45. 
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one of interdependence.32  The former opinion fits better with the general 
pattern seen in chiefdoms.33 
The chiefs undoubtedly had extensive control over the commoners’ 
land rights.  Chiefs gained control of land by force or through loyalty to a 
higher chief.34  In a system often referred to as “feudal,” these chiefs would 
give land to matapules (chiefs’ attendants) to dole out to patrilineal descent 
groups.35  Though the kin groups held some land rights, the chief had 
authority to terminate these rights.36  The people worked on this land as 
subsistence farmers, and the chiefs kept any surplus.37  The chiefs acted 
more like rulers than landlords,38 a pattern that is common in chiefdoms.39 
Around 1797, the Tongan chiefdom broke out into a civil war that 
continued throughout the first half of the 1800s.40  The war was much 
bloodier than previous internal fighting because Westerners had introduced 
modern weaponry into Tonga.41  During this period, Tāufa‘āhua, the son of 
the ruling chief of the Ha‘apai island group, was growing up and learning to 
be a warrior.42  Tāufa‘āhua was a primary instigator in the continuing war as 
he attempted to gain power over more of the islands.43  By 1830, his power 
extended over Ha‘apai, and he had converted to Christianity and renamed 
himself King George after the English king.44  By 1833, he had consolidated 
Ha‘apai and Vava‘u under his power.45  
In 1839, King George implemented the Vava‘u Code on these two 
island groups.46  This code appointed judges to rule on criminal matters, 
                                           
32
  Charles J. Stevens, Symbolic Action and Soil Fertility: Political Ecology and the Transformation 
of Space and Place in Tonga, in POLITICAL ECOLOGY ACROSS SPACES, SCALES, AND SOCIAL GROUPS 154, 
160 (Susan Paulson & Lisa Gezon eds., 2005). 
33
  See Carneiro, supra note 17, at 67. 
34
  See James, supra note 30, at 160. 
35
  See Christopher G. Crawford, Tongan Land Management: Putting the Brakes on the Global 
Economy, 36 J. OF PAC. HIS. 93, 94 (2001); see also Alaric Maude & Feleti Sevele, Tonga: Equality 
Overtaking Privilege, in LAND TENURE IN THE PACIFIC 114, 115-16 (Ron Crocombe ed., 1987). 
36
  Crawford, supra note 35, at 94. 
37
  Id. 
38
  Id. 
39
  See Carneiro, supra note 17, at 67. 
40
  See NOEL RUTHERFORD, SHIRLEY BAKER AND THE KING OF TONGA 8 (1971). 
41
  Id. 
42
  Id.  
43
  See Helen Morton, Remembering Freedom and the Freedom to Remember: Tongan Memories of 
Independence, in CULTURAL MEMORY: RECONFIGURING HISTORY AND IDENTITY IN THE POSTCOLONIAL 
PACIFIC 37, 39 (Jeanette Marie Mageo ed., 2001). 
44
  See RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 8-9. 
45
  Id. at 9. 
46
  Tim René Salomon, Comment, A Balancing Act: Modern Equality vs. Traditional Nobility in 
Tonga, 40 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 369, 375 (2009). 
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limiting the local chiefs’ powers.47  The code also mandated that judges treat 
subjects equally.48  Further, chiefs could no longer forcefully take 
agricultural produce from commoners, and they could now be tried like any 
other Tongan for their actions.49 
 In 1845, King George, who became known as Tupou I, officially 
became king of Tonga by bringing the Tongatapu island group under his 
rule50 and instituted the Code of Law for All Tongans in 1850.51  This code 
purported to create a uniform law for all Tongans, regardless of chiefly 
status.52  In addition, Tupou I claimed title to all of Tonga’s land.53  Sales of 
land to foreigners were prohibited, with leasing permitted upon government 
approval.54 
 Continuing with his lawmaking streak and growing power, Tupou I 
created the Emancipation Edict of 1862, which ostensibly reduced much of 
the chiefs’ power over the commoners.55  In addition to ending the forced 
labor and tithing systems, the edict compelled the chiefs to “allot portions of 
land to the people as they may need, which shall be their farm, and as long 
as the people pay their tribute, and their rent to the chief, it shall not be 
lawful for any chief to dispossess them.”56   
The Emancipation Edict of 1862, along with the Vava‘u Code and the 
Code of Law for All Tongans, could be seen as expanding commoner rights 
vis-à-vis their chiefs.  Tupou I’s motivations in creating these codes should 
not be seen as entirely altruistic—he may have been simply trying to reduce 
his rivals’ power.57  Regardless of Tupou I’s motivations, the Emancipation 
Edict allowed for the continued vitality of the chief-commoner disparity in 
land rights by granting chiefs the authority to receive tributes and rents in 
exchange for land.  When Tupou I promulgated the Constitution of 1875, he 
simply transformed some chiefs into nobles, thus maintaining the ancient 
hierarchy.58  Though commoners were better off with Tupou I’s reforms, he 
                                           
47
  Id. at 376. 
48
  Id. 
49
  ELISE HUFFER, GRANDS HOMMES ET PETITES ÎLES: LA POLITIQUE EXTÉRIEURE DE FIDJI, DE TONGA 
ET DU VANUATU 40 (1993). 
50
  RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 10. 
51
  Salomon, supra note 46, at 376. 
52
  RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 10. 
53
  Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 119.  
54
  Id. 
55
  See id. 
56
  Id. (citing Thomas West, TEN YEARS IN SOUTH-CENTRAL POLYNESIA (1865)). 
57
  RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 10. 
58
  See Salomon, supra note 46, at 376. 
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ultimately allowed chiefs to retain many of the powers they held in the 
chiefdom. 
B. The Constitution of 1875 and Land Act Did Little to Improve 
Commoners’ Political and Land Rights 
Shirley Waldemar Baker, an Englishman and Methodist missionary, 
officially became Tupou I’s advisor in 1872 and assisted him in Tonga’s 
governance.59  Their relationship grew out of mutual need—Baker needed 
Tupou I’s support to establish his dream of an independent Tongan church, 
while Tupou I needed Baker’s help to deal with the encroaching European 
powers.60  Creating a Tongan Constitution was high on Baker’s priority 
list.61  In 1873, Baker began drafting Tonga’s Constitution after consulting 
with Australian and Hawaiian politicians, and when he finished the draft, he 
sent it to a firm of Auckland lawyers to tweak the language.62  On 
November 4, 1875, a fakataha, an assembly of title-holding chiefs, accepted 
the Constitution upon Tupou I’s urging.63  
The new Constitution consisted of 132 articles and was divided into 
three sections:  1) individual rights, 2) form of government, and 3) land 
tenure.64  The Constitution, though recognizing some commoner rights, 
perpetuated disparities in political power and property rights.  Clause 4 
proclaims that “[t]here shall be but one law in Tonga for chiefs and 
commoners,”65 but the balance of the Constitution shows that this is a 
qualified statement.  
The disparity in rights in Constitutional Tonga originates with 
Tupou I’s creation of a landed nobility.66  After the fakataha approved the 
Constitution, Tupou I proceeded to name only 20 of the chiefs as the new 
Tongan nobility, declaring, “I will read out the names of the nobles and in 
case some of you might be hurt because your names are not included, The 
[c]onstitution has this to say about it ‘The King will appoint 20 nobles.’”67  
These nobles received estates with the power to lease lots from them to 
                                           
59
  RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 50.  
60
  Id. at 50-51. 
61
  Id. at 55. 
62
  Id. 
63
  See id. at 55-56; see also Tupou I, The Speech of His Majesty Tupou I at the Close of Parliament 
on 4th November, 1875, in TONGAN LAW REPORTS, Vol. II 3, 3 (D.B. Hunter ed., 1963). 
64
  RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 56. 
65
  THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 4 (“Same law for all classes”).   
66
  See RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 58. 
67
  Tupou I, supra note 63, at 3. 
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commoners, as well as positions in the Legislative Assembly.68  Baker and 
Tupou I likely created the new nobility in order to placate the more powerful 
chiefs.69  
This new nobility was undoubtedly privileged under the Constitution 
in both political and land rights.  Clauses 32, 60, 67, and 71 placed limits on 
commoner political rights.70  Clause 60, for example, established the scheme 
for representation in the Legislative Assembly.71  Originally, it guaranteed 
each noble a spot in the Legislative Assembly, with an equal number of 
commoner representatives allotted by region,72 although commoners 
certainly outnumbered nobles.  In 1914, this number was reduced to seven of 
each class, and was later increased to nine of each class.73 
Besides creating inequality in representation, the Constitution made 
certain subjects off-limits for the People’s (commoners’) Representatives.  
For example, Clause 32 established that in certain cases, the nobility may 
select successors to the throne without commoner input.74  Further, Clause 
67, titled “Privilege of nobles,” states that “it shall be lawful for only the 
nobles of the Legislative Assembly to discuss or vote upon laws relating to 
the King or Royal Family or the titles and inheritances of the nobles.”75  
Additionally, Clause 71 prohibited commoner representatives from 
participating in trials to impeach nobles.76  The effect of these articles is both 
that commoners are underrepresented in the Legislative Assembly, and also 
that their representatives have limited powers on subjects related to the 
nobles and monarchy.77 
The Constitution also vested the twenty new nobles with some special 
land rights, while limiting every man’s control over his land.  Clause 104 
states that “[a]ll the land is the property of the King” and allows for the 
                                           
68
  Id. at 4-5. 
69
  See RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 58. 
70
  THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988). 
71
  Id. at cl. 60 (“Representative members”). 
72
  MARCUS, supra note 11, at 74. 
73
  THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 60 (“Representative members”). 
74
  Id. at cl. 32 (“Succession to the Throne”); see also Salomon, supra note 46, at 371. 
75
  THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 67 (“Privilege of nobles”); see also Salomon, 
supra note 46, at 372. 
76
  THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 71 (“Noble may be deprived of his seat”); see 
also Salomon, supra note 46, at 372. 
77
  See generally Salomon, supra note 46, at 371-73.  Besides the Legislative Assembly, commoners 
also receive some representation via the fono, or public meeting, held by a noble, a government official, or 
the town, or village.  The meetings may be held so that the chief can give orders, but some may be willing 
to allow commoners to influence local decision-making.  Ropate Qalo, Tonga, in DECENTRALISATION IN 
THE SOUTH PACIFIC 238, 242 (Peter Larmour & Ropate Qalo eds., 1985).  
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nobles of Tupou I’s choosing to have hereditary estates that only other 
nobles may inherit.78  Though no one may sell land, they may lease it in 
accordance with the Constitution—Clause 105 limits the term of leases to 99 
years, unless the Privy Council gives approval otherwise.79  Further, 
Clause 114 requires the cabinet’s approval for all leases, subleases, and 
transfers lasting 99 years or less, and the Privy Council’s approval when 
over 99 years.80 
Tupou I intended that the nobles would allot land from their hereditary 
estates to commoners.81  On the close of the new parliament on November 4, 
1875, however, Tupou I implored his newly-created nobility not to be hasty 
in making allotments to commoners.82  The nobles must have taken this 
seriously—they had granted no allotments by 1880.83  To remedy this, 
Shirley Baker became minister of lands in 1880 and two years later created 
the Land Act, which “established the right of each male Tongan of taxpaying 
age sixteen to be granted a town allotment and a gardening or ‘tax’ allotment 
by the owner of the estate on which he lived.”84  Tax allotments are heritable 
in the male line and are to be up to 8.25 acres.85  The same year, Tupou I 
granted thirty hereditary estates to an expanded nobility and six to 
matapules, or the spokesmen for the chiefs.86  The rest of the land became 
government land, so commoner allotments are apportioned from the 
hereditary nobles’ estates, from land held by the monarchy, and from some 
land designated as “government” land.87  A majority of commoners live on 
the hereditary nobles’ estates.88   
The Land Act has not changed much since 1882.  In 1891, however, 
the Act was changed to make the government responsible for granting 
allotments, and the estate-holders had only the right to receive the rent.89  
                                           
78
  THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 104 (“Land vested in crown—sale prohibited”); 
see also Salomon, supra note 46, at 372. 
79
  THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 105 (“Terms of leases”).  The status of this 
clause is unclear after the 2010 Constitutional amendments related to executive power.  See CEC FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 8, at 108. 
80
  THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 114 (“No lease etc. without consent”).  The 
status of this clause is unclear after the 2010 Constitutional amendments related to executive power.  See 
CEC FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 108. 
81
  Tupou I, supra note 63, at 5. 
82
  Id. 
83
  See RUTHERFORD, supra note 40, at 99. 
84
  Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 120. 
85
  The Land Act of 1988, § 7 (“Right to allotment”) (Tonga).  
86
  Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 121. 
87
  Id. 
88
  Id. 
89
  Id. at 120.  
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The trend toward limiting the nobles’ power over the land was reversed in 
1915, when nobles earned the statutory right to be consulted before the 
minister of lands could make an allotment on their estates.90  The Land Act 
also requires commoner occupants to pay their nobles a yearly rent.91 
In 1976, the Land Act was amended to allow for mortgages of 
allotments, and in 1980, the maximum mortgage period was set to thirty 
years.92  In practice, the mortgages allowed by the Land Act are not very 
valuable, as banks may only foreclose on the remaining period; banks are 
thus reluctant to make loans.93 
Commoners were also granted the ability to lease out their tax 
allotments for up to 10 years and town allotments for up to 99 years with the 
cabinet’s approval and for more than 99 years with the Privy Council’s 
approval.94  The cabinet has tended to allow increasingly shorter leases, 
usually of 50 years; the 99-year leases are rare.95  The cabinet may place 
other restrictions on the leases as well.96   
 The specialized Land Court hears any disputes involving the Land 
Act.97  The king and the Privy Council appoint the judge of the Land Court 
and a panel of assessors.98  An appeal lies of right, but this appeal must be 
taken to the Privy Council rather than to the supreme court.99  The king also 
appoints a minister of lands in his Privy Council, who is invariably a 
noble.100 
 Though an allotment is legally due to them, many Tongan men will 
not receive one.  In practice, it is easiest for men to inherit land.101  However, 
Tongan families are large, so many men will not inherit land and must 
acquire a vacant allotment.102  This can be difficult because in some areas all 
the allotments have been registered.103 
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 Once a Tongan man finds an allotment, his difficulties may not end.  
Nobles can continue to exercise power over the commoners in allotting 
parcels of their estates: 
Noble lands have not been completely allocated and/or 
registered.  A noble’s signature is required before land on a 
noble’s estate can be registered in a commoner’s name.  Many 
nobles are reluctant to allow their people to register land.  By 
simply allocating land for commoners’ use but not allowing 
registration, the noble retains control over the land.  The 
promise of registration requires that the commoner remain on 
good relations with the noble.  This often means obeying the 
noble’s orders and providing him with ‘gifts’ of food, money, 
handicrafts or imported goods.  It may also mean leaving the 
land to make way for someone (often foreigners) who has the 
capital to lease the land for themselves from the noble.104 
Thus, finding an open allotment on a noble’s estate will not guarantee 
security in land rights for the commoner occupant.  The Land Act’s 
requirement of noble approval for allotment allows for these extra-legal 
abuses. 
The lucky men who do register their allotments may face additional 
hurdles.  The Land Act requires that holders of registered allotments pay 
eighty seniti (totaling only about fifty U.S. cents) in yearly rent for their 
holdings.105  Those on nobles’ estates must pay this to the noble; the nobles 
frequently ask for payment in the form of tribute of other items.106  These 
tributes often exceed the statutorily-mandated amount, and the sum 
requested may be “debilitating.”107  In this system, the noble acts much like 
a traditional chief, and it is unclear whether commoners go along with it 
because they believe it is legally required or for some other reason.108  It also 
does not seem that they do this because of fear of eviction—few people have 
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  Crawford, supra note 35, at 96.  
105
  The Land Act of 1988, § 31 (“Holder’s right to rents”) (Tonga). 
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been evicted from their allotments.109  For whatever reason that commoners 
allow this manipulation, the Land Act’s mandate that rent be paid to the 
noble legally enables it. 
In 1984, allotted, unregistered land made up 19.28% of the total area 
of Tonga, with 43.28% held as registered allotments, 8.07% under leasehold, 
and only 6.94% remaining to be allotted.110  This means that (if these or 
similar statistics still hold true) nobles could cause insecurity in land rights 
on much of Tonga’s land.  Meanwhile, the population of Tonga continues to 
grow, and the government can no longer provide the statutory allotment 
owed to its men in some areas.111  The scarcity of land and the insecurity in 
existing allotments create a precarious situation for Tongan commoners. 
 These legal and factual issues have caused a black market in land 
tenure to appear.  Beginning around the first half of the twentieth century, 
Tonga’s commoners have “bought” and “sold” allotments illegally to others, 
although what they are really doing is buying the landholder’s right to use 
the allotment.112  The government largely ignores these extra-legal 
exchanges.113  Though the black market can provide commoners with 
income, it falls far short of providing the benefits that institutionally-
recognized land rights could bring. 
While Tonga has changed in its structure from chiefdom to 
Constitutional monarchy over the past 137 years, it has enshrined and 
perpetuated the disparity between commoners and nobility in both property 
and political rights through positive law and de facto practice.  As one writer 
put it, “[r]oyalty and nobility effectively work together through 
Constitutionalized government institutions, to ensure perpetuation of the 
monarchy’s and the nobility’s strong position as estate holders.”114  Tonga’s 
past and present show that Tongan institutions do enshrine the ancient 
hierarchy to the commoners’ detriment. 
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C. The Growing Pro-Democracy Movement, Including the 2006 Riots, 
Made it Clear that the Tongan Government Would Have to Reform its 
Legal System 
The 2006 riots in the capital of Nuku‘alofa shocked the Tongan 
government, which appeared ill-prepared to deal with the violence.  Dubbed 
“16-11,” the November 16, 2006 chaos began as protestors took to the 
streets to object to the Legislative Assembly’s plan to adjourn for the year, 
though it had done nothing appreciable to honor its promise of advancing 
democracy.115  The protestors became violent, tipping cars, burning 
buildings, and looting; eventually, eight protestors were killed.116  They 
targeted government and elite-owned property and left the business district 
in ruins.117  The surprised Tongan government asked New Zealand and 
Australia to send troops to quell the riots.118  The next day, the Tongan 
government declared a state of emergency in the area, which was not lifted 
until February 2011.119  It not only limited the size of gatherings in certain 
areas,120 but also allowed police to stop and frisk anyone in the area without 
requiring any level of suspicion.121  
The riots were the culmination of the modern pro-democracy 
movement, which is thought to have originated in the 1970s and 1980s.122  
The movement has generally focused on a call for an expanded legislature 
and a more accountable executive.123  The pro-democracy reformers held 
several Constitutional conventions throughout the 1990s, and they offered 
three different proposals for political reforms—one in 1997 and two in 
2002.124  There was no discussion of changes to Part III of the Constitution 
(“The Land”), and ultimately the Legislative Assembly and executive took 
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 See Tonga Reimposes Emergency Regulations, RADIO N.Z. NEWS, Sept. 10, 2008, 
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no notice of the proposed reforms, though they were quite conservative in 
scope.125  
Though the conventions did not discuss land, Tongans have 
considered land reform.126  In 1975, the Tonga Council of Churches held a 
seminar on land tenure in which many commoners voiced their complaints 
about the land tenure system.127  The push for land reform eventually led to 
the Land Act amendments allowing mortgages and leases of tax allotments, 
but went no further.128  The pro-democracy proponent ‘Akilisi Pohiva has 
also called for reform of the land tenure system from time to time, but he has 
been largely ignored.129 
The riots were seemingly the Tongan government’s final wake-up call 
for reform:  four years later, an election would be held under a new 
Constitution in which commoners would vote for more of the Legislative 
Assembly members.130  The next part explains how this purported “ordinary 
peoples’ constitution” will change little in Tonga in terms of commoners’ 
rights, especially land rights. 
III. THE 2010 AMENDMENTS DID LITTLE TO CHANGE POLITICAL 
REPRESENTATION AND ARE UNLIKELY TO INFLUENCE LAND LAWS 
The pro-democracy movement and the riots were the impetus for the 
2010 Constitutional amendments, but whether these amendments will 
change anything for commoners is doubtful.  This part will:  1) describe the 
2010 changes to the Tongan Constitution, which altered the structure of the 
Legislative Assembly, 2) argue that these changes have done little to increase 
political effectiveness for commoners as the 2010 election shows, and 3) 
suggest that these changes will also not lead to commoner-friendly land 
reform. 
A. The 2010 Amendments Aimed to Give Commoners Increased Political 
Representation 
The riots pressured the Legislative Assembly to pass the 
Constitutional and Electoral Commission Act in 2008, which created a 
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commission that is “required to make interim and final reports and 
recommendations on Constitutional and electoral reform to the Privy 
Council and the Legislative Assembly.”131  In creating policy for these 
reforms, the commission’s members went from district to district in Tonga 
and held meetings to assess public opinion.132  The Constitutional and 
Electoral Commission (“CEC”) created several reports, which detailed the 
results of these meetings, and in the last report, the CEC recommended that 
Tonga implement a Legislative Assembly with increased commoner 
representation.133  The government accepted this advice, amending the 
Constitution in 2010.134 
The 2010 amendments were seemingly revolutionary.  Under the new 
Constitution, which has been called the “ordinary peoples’ Constitution,” the 
commoners may elect seventeen members of the twenty-six member 
Legislative Assembly; previously they could only elect nine of the thirty-
three representatives.135  Additionally, the prime minister must be elected 
from and recommended by the assembly; before, the king appointed the 
prime minister.136  The CEC recommended that the first election under this 
“new” Constitution be held in 2010.137 
B. The 2010 Amendments Have Done Little in Practice to Change 
Commoner Political Representation 
In the November 2010 election, candidates from the Democratic Party 
of the Friendly Islands (“DPFI”) and many independent candidates vied for 
the seventeen commoner seats.138  DPFI members took eleven seats, and 
independents took the remaining six.139  When the parliament met to decide 
the new prime minister (“PM”), all of the independents voted with the 
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nobles and elected the noble Lord Tu‘ivakano as PM.140  Dr. Crosbie Walsh, 
a professor of the University of the South Pacific, remarked: 
There is an obvious moral to this story.  Tonga has taken a small 
step forward towards a more representative parliament but 
effective power and authority continues to reside in the same 
hands . . . .  Appearance not substance is what counts.  Overseas 
armchair democrats and politicians can be content.  There has 
been an “election”—and little substantial change.141 
Walsh’s remarks, made in an online commentary published on 
January 3, 2011,142 came during rapid political changes in the new 
government in late 2010 and early 2011.  The new Tongan PM was already 
under fire by December 30, 2010, because he named two unelected ministers 
to his cabinet.143  Then, on January 14, 2011, the PM’s new health minister, 
the commoner and pro-democracy reformer ‘Akilisi Pohiva, stepped 
down.144  Pohiva, a member of DPFI, refused to sign an agreement to not 
vote against the government and had previously expressed anger at the 
appointment of the two unelected members.145  For these reasons, he stepped 
down seventeen days after his appointment.146  After Pohiva’s resignation, 
only one DPFI member remains in the cabinet.147 
Lord Tu‘ivakano’s election as PM, combined with these rapid changes 
soon after the November election, indicate that perhaps the CEC’s suggested 
amendments have not changed much at all, and commoners continue to lack 
an ability to effect change in their government.  Further, Pohiva’s resignation 
and the resulting discord may be early symptoms of growing political 
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C. The Recent Amendments Are Unlikely to Change Land Tenure Laws 
If little has changed politically, even less is likely to change in the 
land tenure system.  Professor Guy Powles, an expert in Tongan 
Constitutional law, anticipated that the issue of noble estates would be one of 
the most contentious areas of Constitutional reform.148  He doubted that any 
real reform to the noble estate system could happen without significant 
change in the Tongan political structure.149  As noted above, the country’s 
elite still largely controls the new government, so it seems unlikely that they 
will allow for any statutory or Constitutional changes in property laws.   
The 1875 Constitution and its related reforms brought some stability 
to Tonga and respected commoner rights to an extent, but still recognized 
some Tongans as privileged.  So far, the recent reforms appear to be much of 
the same—they bring the facade of change, but really do little.  The next part 
explains why land reform, though controversial, is necessary for Tonga’s 
stability.   
IV. WITHOUT LAND REFORM, TONGA’S POLITICAL INSTABILITY WILL 
CONTINUE 
Tonga’s Constitutional and Electoral Commission (“CEC”), in its first 
progress report, observed that commoners were more concerned about land 
tenure than changes in political representation: 
In every district, there was repeated concern about the land 
issue and the fear of the consequences of any change in the 
present laws relating to it, especially the likelihood of 
alienation.  In many cases this appeared to be a matter of more 
significance and concern than electoral and representational 
change or other changes to the [c]onstitution.  It is noteworthy 
that the concerns about land had been foreshadowed in some of 
the written submissions by groups of members of the public.  
The Commissioners had frequently to explain that all issues 
about land and public administration, local or national, were 
outside of the statutory purview of this Commission . . . .  It was 
apparent that many ordinary Tongans have little interest in 
politics or the structure of the government. This may arise 
partly from a lack of ability to affect change over many 
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generations but comments in the outer districts suggest it also 
stems as much from the need to support themselves and their 
families and a perception that government, however formed, 
will simply continue to neglect their interests.150 
The CEC’s observations are telling in two ways:  they demonstrate that 
practical land issues are of great concern to Tongans, perhaps more so than 
electoral change, and they also acknowledge that the nobility-controlled 
government did not grant the CEC the power to suggest changes relating to 
the land system.151 
 This part argues that the concern over land is predictable and has deep 
roots, which can be explained using models from evolutionary ecology.  This 
part will clarify why Tonga’s political instability is about land, and explain 
why this instability has happened recently.  Then it will give some 
suggestions on how Tonga can tame instability by amending the Constitution 
and Land Act to:  1) reduce the nobles’ power over land rights, 2) allow for 
more commoners to at least occupy land, and 3) institute policies that would 
improve the productivity of commoner lands. 
A. Evolutionary Ecological Models Suggest That Tonga’s Political 
Instability Is Closely Tied to Its Land Tenure System 
 If law’s principal endeavor is to influence human behavior according 
to societal norms, its ability to change behavior, and to do so efficiently, is a 
function of the accuracy of the behavioral models relied upon.152  These 
models predict how human behavior will change in response to particular 
laws.153   
Evolutionary ecology, and in particular the subfield of Human 
Behavior Ecology (“HBE”), can provide fertile ideas for how to change 
human behavior using law.154  HBE focuses on the evolutionary origins of 
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behavior and thus provides a valuable framework for predicting it.  
Accordingly, it is a useful tool for solving complex social problems, 
including those involving law.  This theoretical approach understands human 
behavior as an evolved response to the socio-environmental context; that is, 
the human psyche’s flexibility in responding to socio-environmental cues is 
itself an adaptation, allowing individuals to adjust their behavior in order to 
promote personal interests.155  These adjustments are not made as a result of 
conscious striving for fitness (that is, reproductive success),156 but are 
accomplished through intermediate goals, such as aiming for increased 
prestige in one’s social group, finding mates, and securing material 
resources.157 
Working under this theoretical umbrella, HBE researchers have two 
main predictions for human behavior:  “individuals will behave in ways that 
best suit their reproductive interests,” and “the prediction that people will try 
to influence the social rules and other aspects of their culture in such a way 
as to promote their reproductive interests.”158  A society’s laws will thus 
“tend to assume a form that serves the reproductive interests” of the 
powerful.159  These predictions make sense when considering Tonga’s 
nobles, who have commandeered the legal system to serve their interests.  
But what about the commoners? 
It is paradoxical that hierarchical human societies like Tonga should 
exist at all, given the pull of individual interests.  Formations of human 
societies result from individuals weighing the costs (for example, “increased 
competition for resources, increased exposure to disease”) and benefits (for 
example, “enhanced access to resources or mates”) of joining the group, and 
“[w]here benefits outweigh costs, groups should form and continue to grow 
as long as all the members benefit relative to dispersal or alternative 
affiliation.”160  Inequality and exploitation occur when individuals have a 
lack of options: 
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Under conditions of intense competition or where unoccupied 
territory no longer exists, the lack of alternative strategies for 
individuals may promote group affiliation even in the face of 
extreme disadvantage to some, perhaps most, of its members.  
And it is under these conditions that particular individuals, 
kingroups, or coalitions can exploit the lack of alternative 
strategies as leverage to gain control of resources at the expense 
of others.  The result is hierarchical social organization based 
on unequal access to resources . . . .  [G]roups characterized by 
exploitation and inequality can be said to develop out of mutual 
self-interest, even if many members of the group are seriously 
disadvantaged.161 
This reasoning explains why Tonga is inegalitarian:  the sea circumscribes 
the islands, limiting people’s ability to leave, even when highly 
disadvantaged in political and land rights.162  In other contexts, individuals 
may move to unoccupied territory or may be able to migrate out of the area 
completely.163  Additionally, fighting with those who control or hold 
resources may be a viable strategy for some people.164  However, in some 
contexts, the best strategy is for the commoners to accept their lot, even 
though they are highly disadvantaged relative to the elite. 
 Throughout their history, Tongan commoners have pursued strategies 
other than submission.  Early on, inland migration and migration to other 
islands in the archipelago was common.165  Migration to other nations is also 
common—Tongan migration to Australia has been extensive.166  The Church 
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of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has greatly facilitated Tongan migration 
to the United States.167 
 Fighting the elite for control of resources is another strategy, and it is 
one that Tongans have pursued at various times.  Tonga has been unstable 
during periods in which individuals fought for control of the islands as noted 
in Part II.  Individuals may choose to fight resource-holders under certain 
ecological conditions168—for example, they may fight resource-holders 
when the resource fought for is very valuable, or when the resource-holder is 
an easy target, or when both are true.169  Thus, the particulars of an 
environment determine which resources are valuable enough to fight for and 
the respective costs of those fights.170  As one anthropologist put it, 
“competition for resources in limited supply can directly influence the 
reproductive success of the individual competitors.”171  In Tonga, land is a 
limited resource as commoners are still largely dependent on subsistence 
farming, and land is in short supply.172  Thus, we would expect to see 
aggression related to land in Tonga.  Lastly, “fighting” need not be formal 
conflict or warfare—aggressive displays, including violent protests, can 
serve the same purpose by intimidating resource-controllers into forfeiting 
some of their control.173 
B. While Land Has Become Scarcer and Less Productive in Tonga, the 
Controllers of Land Have Become Easier to Fight 
Scholars have posited various theories to explain why the recent push 
for Tongan democracy did not occur until late in the twentieth century.  
Some have attributed the pro-democracy movement to education, while 
others have explained it through teleological theories of cultural 
advancement, among other rationales.174  None, however, have attempted to 
explain the pro-democracy movement as a direct result of increasing 
population pressures within a nation of insecure land rights.  Past tensions in 
                                           
167
  Lee Davidson, One of Every Four Tongans in the U.S. Calls Utah Home, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE 
ONLINE, Sept. 11, 2011, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/52551592-90/california-family-hawaii-
population.html.csp. 
168
  See KREBS & DAVIES, supra note 164, at 155-56. 
169
  Id.; see also Joseph H. Manson & Richard W. Wrangham, Intergroup Aggression in Chimpanzees 
and Humans, 32 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 369, 369 (1991).  
170
  See KREBS & DAVIES, supra note 164, at 155-56. 
171
  William H. Durham, Resource Competition and Human Aggression, Part I, 51 THE Q. REV. OF 
BIOLOGY 385, 390 (1976). 
172
  Stevens, supra note 32, at 163. 
173
  “Intergroup aggression” is defined in Manson & Wrangham, supra note 169, at 369-70. 
174
  See Kerry E. James, Tonga’s Pro-Democracy Movement, 67 PAC. AFFAIRS 242, 242-43 (1994). 
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Tonga were inextricably entwined with the fight for control of land—why 
should the current tensions be any different? 
 In the decades before the current pro-democracy movement gained 
steam, a confluence of factors tended to reduce the amount of land available 
for allotment and the value of land that commoners already held.  Population 
growth continued exponentially,175 due in part to the then-monarch’s (Queen 
Salote’s) focus on improving health.176  Migration became more difficult,177 
so those who would have moved off the islands had to stay.  Further, soil 
quality deteriorated so commoner allotments were less productive.178    
 Additionally, the perceived ability of the monarch and the nobility to 
hold and defend their power and their lands may have declined.  The elite 
landholders may have become less likely to violently repel commoners 
engaged in protests for fear of involvement from New Zealand, Australia, or 
other powerful states.  In fact, during the 2006 riots, the New Zealand 
government refused to send troops if it would appear to be supporting the 
established power structure against the pro-democracy movement.179  The 
Tongan government, however, has been training its military in counter-
insurgency drills as a result of the 2006 riots,180 which will make the struggle 
for commoner rights even harder.  The state of emergency, as mentioned in 
Part III, also shows that the elite are using force to quell violence rather than 
improving commoners’ lives.181  Unfortunately, it appears as if Tonga’s elites 
may work to strengthen their own power, rather than improving land tenure 
for commoners, in order to deal with Tonga’s instability. 
C. Solutions to Tonga’s Political Instability Lie in Amending the 
Constitution and the Land Act and in Creating New Agricultural 
Policies 
 Tonga’s instability could be solved in two ways:  by strengthening the 
power of the elite, so that commoners are cowed into accepting noble 
exploitation, or by instituting land reform that would make violence less 
attractive to the commoners.  Rather than strengthening the elite, Tonga 
should alter its laws and policies to secure commoner land rights, to allow 
                                           
175
  James, supra note 30, at 180. 
176
  See I. C. CAMPBELL, ISLAND KINGDOM: TONGA ANCIENT AND MODERN 142, 162 (1992). 
177
  Cowling, supra note 166, at 179. 
178
  Stevens, supra note 32, at 162-63.  
179
  WikiLeaks Cable, supra note 118. 
180
  Tonga Military Exercise to Focus on Counter Insurgency, RADIO N.Z. INT’L., Aug. 14, 2011, 
http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=62390. 
181
  Tonga Government Removes Emergency Regulations, supra note 119. 
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for more commoners to access land, and to improve the productivity of 
occupied land.  To secure commoner land rights, noble control over land 
must be reduced or eliminated.  To allow for more commoners to access 
land, allotment size may have to be reduced, new surveys must be taken, and 
public works projects should focus on areas such as outer islands and other 
rural areas, which may have unused and potentially productive lands.  
Additionally, allotments could be revoked from commoners living abroad.  
In order to harness the capital of occupied lands, the system of leases and 
mortgages must be wrested from government control.  Further, community 
development banking may be beneficial for improving allotment 
productivity.  In addition, reforming the inheritance system would also 
encourage commoners to better use their lands.  As discussed below, changes 
in the political representation system are probably necessary before the 
Legislative Assembly would implement these reforms.  Lastly, any disputes 
regarding land issues should be appealable to the supreme court.  If 
executed, these reforms could improve commoner fitness and thereby reduce 
the chances that commoners would engage in violent behavior against the 
elite. 
1. To Secure Commoner Land Rights, Noble Control over Land Must Be 
Reduced or Eliminated 
 Noble control over commoner lands should be eliminated by allowing 
commoners who currently occupy allotments to own them outright.182  The 
benefits of private property in developing economies are too numerous to 
discuss in this comment,183 except to point out that secure private property 
gives owners the incentive—that is, self-interest—to use land most 
productively: 
 
                                           
182
  Recently, the government tried to set up the Royal Town of Neiafu in Vava‘u in order to create a 
local administration that would help change traditional land laws.  Tonga Government Advised Against 
 Change in Neiafu, RADIO N.Z. INT’L., Sept. 9, 2011, http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op=read&id=6
3231.  The residents have reportedly rejected this local administration, and the government has moved out.  
Id.  The reporting on this topic has been unclear, and it is difficult to discern why exactly commoners have 
rejected the government’s scheme. 
183
  For a general overview of the importance of private property to economic development, see 
Gerald P. O’Driscoll Jr. & Lee Hoskins, Property Rights: The Key to Economic Development, POLICY 
ANALYSIS, Aug. 7, 2003, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa482.pdf; see also Hernando de Soto, 
The Mystery of Capital, 38 FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 1 (2001), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/03/desoto.htm. 
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Why does an individual invest unless to gain something for 
himself and his family?  How can he ensure that gains flowing 
from his activity be appropriated and secured other than 
through a system of well-defined property rights?  To suppose 
otherwise, is to suppose that human nature will change.  That 
road is a dead end.184 
Secure property rights would encourage commoners to use their lands more 
productively—commoners would not expect the excess produce to be 
diverted to nobles as tribute, nor that their lands would be suddenly snatched 
from them to give to a noble’s new favored occupant.  Increased allotment 
productivity, combined with gains from the resources that would have gone 
to nobles, will improve commoner fitness and will make it less likely that 
commoners will resort to force to access and control resources.  Increased 
allotment productivity should also improve the Tongan economy for all 
Tongans.185   
 One could argue that because Tongan families often use allotments as 
a family, that ownership should be vested in all of them.  However, familial 
ownership may make it difficult to alienate the land or make decisions 
regarding its use.  Allotments have been granted in only one man’s name 
since their inception,186 so it would not be a shock to Tongans to vest 
ownership in one person as well.  In addition, if alienation becomes legal, 
nothing would stop Tongans from purchasing and holding property in the 
names of all the family members if they so desire.   
Several Constitutional amendments are required to grant commoners a 
fee simple187 interest in their allotments.188  Most importantly, Clause 104 
(“Land vested in crown—Sale prohibited”) would have to be modified to 
remove the language “All the land is the property of the King” and “It is 
hereby declared by this [c]onstitution . . . that it shall not be lawful for 
anyone at any time hereafter whether he be the King or any one of the chiefs 
or the people of this country to sell any land whatever in the Kingdom of 
Tonga.”189  Allotments would no longer be the property of the king, and 
commoners could freely alienate their lands.   
                                           
184
  O’Driscoll & Hoskins, supra note 183, at 7. 
185
  The ability of a formal, private property system to unlock the capital in assets is discussed in de 
Soto, supra note 183. 
186
  Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 120. 
187
  Fee simple is defined as “[a]n interest in land that, being the broadest property interest allowed by 
law, endures until the current holder dies without heirs.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 691 (9th ed. 2009). 
188
  See infra, Part IV.C.4, for the process of Constitutional amendment. 
189
  THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 104 (“Land vested in crown—Sale prohibited”). 
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Interestingly, the Constitution already provides a due process clause 
(Clause 18 in the Declaration of Rights), which states that “[a]ll the people 
have the right to expect that the Government will protect their life[,] 
liberty[,] and property and therefore it is right for all the people to support 
and contribute to the Government according to law”; it also declares that fair 
value will be paid in cases of eminent domain.190  This clause would, given 
proper judicial interpretation, help secure commoner property rights.191  
Lastly, Clause 113 (“Right to allotments”) could be amended to transform 
the “right to hold an hereditary tax and town allotment” 192 into the current 
occupant’s right to hold a fee simple interest in that allotment, but this could 
also be achieved by amending the Land Act.  The language in Clause 113 
requiring the allotment-holder to pay rents193 would also have to be 
removed.  These amendments will obviate much of the Land Act, which 
deals heavily with commoner allotments.194 
The Tongan legal system is perhaps better suited to instituting a 
formal private property system than other developing countries, because it 
already has a centralized system in place for recording deeds.195  
Centralized, formal recordation is necessary for a viable private property 
system, as it allows a way to prove one’s interest in a specific property as 
well as an efficient and secure means to prove the transfer of the property.196  
Indeed, Clause 110 of the Constitution (“Registration of deeds”) states that 
“no lease or transfer will be considered valid or recognized by the 
Government unless registered in the office of the Minister of Lands.”197  
Part VIII of the Land Act (“Registration of Title”)198 sets forth the steps 
required to register allotments and leases, and the Act also contains required 
forms for allotments, leases, and mortgages, which include a description of 
                                           
190
  Id. at cl. 18 (“Taxation.  Compensation to be paid for property taken”).  It is worth nothing that the 
focus seems to be on what the government gets in exchange for according due process to its citizens, an 
orientation that is not surprising given Tonga’s history. 
191
  A keyword search in the South Pacific legal research site paclii.org did not turn up any relevant 
cases interpreting Clause 18.  
192
  “Every person who holds a tax and town allotment shall pay such rents therefore as may be 
determined by the Legislature.”  THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 113 (“Right to 
allotments”). 
193
  Id. 
194
  See generally The Land Act of 1988 (Tonga). 
195
  See THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 110 (“Registration of deeds”); The Land Act 
of 1988, part VIII (“Registration of Title”) (Tonga). 
196
  The importance of a formal registration system is discussed in de Soto, supra note 183. 
197
  THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 110 (“Registration of deeds”). 
198
  The Land Act of 1988, part VIII (“Registration of Title”) (Tonga). 
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the property involved.199  This system could easily be modified for deeds 
held in fee simple.  Tonga’s formal representational system would allow 
Tongans to fully unlock the potential of the capital in their lands.   
 Allowing commoners a fee simple ownership interest in their 
allotments may not be a realistic reform in the near future, given the 
influence of the nobles.  The Land Act could nevertheless be modified to 
remove the nobles from the allotment and registration process in order to 
reduce their control of commoner lands.  This should allow for greater 
allotment productivity and for commoners to keep more of what they 
produce.  As discussed above, before 1915, nobles were severed from the 
allotment process—their consultation was not required for the minister of 
lands to register a plot to a commoner.200  The commoner would simply 
apply for the allotment, the minister of lands would approve it, and the 
commoner would pay rent to the noble through the government.201  This 
system kept the noble from requiring commoners to pay tribute or to 
otherwise ingratiate the noble in exchange for the ability to register the 
allotment.  The Land Act was again amended in 1915, requiring the noble’s 
consultation for allotment,202 and thus allowing nobles to go back to 
demanding tribute in exchange.  
The Land Act should be amended to its pre-1915 version on this issue.  
This requires striking the language in Sections 8 and 34 stating that the 
noble’s consultation is required for registration.203  It may be difficult, 
however, to enforce this provision if commoners do not know about the legal 
change.  The Ministry of Lands could educate commoners, perhaps through 
flyers, explaining that a noble’s permission is no longer required to register 
land.  These flyers could be distributed to churches to ensure that large 
numbers of commoners see them.  To discourage nobles from violating this 
new rule, those who do so may be fined, or the amount of rent they receive 
could be reduced.  Nobles are already subject to criminal penalties (as well 
as civil damages) under the Land Act for unlawfully dispossessing an 
                                           
199
  See, e.g., id. at schedule IX  (“Application for lease”) (Tonga). 
200
  Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 120-21. 
201
  Id. at 120.  
202
  Id.; The Land Act of 1988, § 8 (“Tofias to provide allotment”) (Tonga) (“land comprised in an 
hereditary estate shall not be granted as a tax or town allotment without prior consultation with the holder 
of the hereditary estate”). 
203
  The Land Act of 1988, § 8 (“Tofias to provide allotment”) (Tonga).  Section 34 currently requires 
the minister of lands to grant any contested allotment, but that the noble may appeal the decision within 
three months to the land court.  Id. at § 34 (“Holder may not refuse land for allotment”).  This commoner-
friendly provision legally removes some noble control, but it does not eliminate the nobles’ incentives to 
exploit the commoners in exchange for not causing trouble in the registration process.  
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allotment holder,204 so these proposed penalties for nobles would not be 
atypical. 
 Further, the Land Act should be amended to protect commoners who 
have already registered allotments.  Before 1915, the Land Act required that 
commoners pay the government their rents in cash, and the government 
would pay the rent to the noble; this was later amended so that the noble was 
again paid directly.205  The government should revert to the pre-1915 Land 
Act on the issue of allotment rent as well, so that the nobles would find it 
more difficult to demand other tributes instead of rent.  This would require 
inserting language into Section 31 that mandates that a noble will receive the 
statutory rent from the government after the commoner has paid the rent, 
rather than directly from the commoner.  The Ministry of Lands should send 
notices to occupants to ensure this provision is followed, and fines should be 
imposed on nobles who attempt to extract additional tributes from 
commoners.  Another option would be to allow the nobles to continue 
receiving rents directly but to subject them to fines if they try to demand 
tributes instead of the statutory rents.  Again, criminal penalties for nobles 
who try to circumvent this provision could be easily inserted into the Land 
Act.  
A last option would be to eliminate the noble completely and allow 
the crown to collect and retain the rents.  However, such a scheme may make 
commoner land rights more insecure, as power over land would be 
concentrated in the crown rather than diffused among the crown and the 
thirty-three nobles,206 possibly increasing the chances for abuse.  The above 
reforms are thus more likely to be palatable to both nobles and commoners. 
2. Tonga Should Amend the Land Act and Change its Land Policies to 
Increase the Amount of Land Available for Allotment 
 These reforms, however, do not directly address the problem of the 
ever-increasing number of young men who will not receive land at all, 
though private property may be the eventual solution to land scarcity.  
Allowing current commoner occupants to own their allotments in a fee-
simple interest could eventually move many Tongans away from a 
subsistence lifestyle, alleviating some land scarcity.  For example, a Tongan 
                                           
204
  Id. at § 32 (“Holder may not dispossess allotment holder”). 
205
 Id. at § 31 (“Holder’s right to rents”); Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 120.  
206
  See David Boaz, Defining an Ownership Society, CATO INSTITUTE,  available at 
http://www.cato.org/special/ownership_society/boaz.html. 
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man who owns his land may use it more productively and keep more of the 
fruits of his labors, allowing him enough capital to start a business in the 
city, and perhaps to sell his allotment.  Freeing the potential capital in 
Tongan lands may solve the land scarcity problem as commoners move into 
new market sectors and as land is used more efficiently.  Instituting a 
private-property system would also allow women to own land, something 
that may not be possible without permitting commoners to alienate their 
lands.  It is difficult to see how women could also be entitled to allotments 
given Tonga’s current population pressures. 
If Tonga makes only modest reforms and continues to entitle each 
man to an allotment, land scarcity will be a more pressing problem.  This 
problem could be addressed by reducing the maximum size of allotments in 
the Land Act.207  In Section 7 (“Right to allotment”), the Land Act entitles 
each man to up to 3.3387 hectares as a tax allotment, as well as a smaller 
town allotment for his house.208  The Legislative Assembly could amend the 
Land Act, reducing the maximum amount a man is entitled to.  The viability 
of this reform may depend on whether smaller allotments would be 
adequately productive, a question that would require scientific study.   
Further, there may be more land available for allotment than is 
currently assumed.  Tonga has performed cadastral surveys before, most 
notably in 1962, and has redrawn allotment boundaries,209 but an updated 
survey will accommodate the changes of the past few decades.  The Land 
Act allows the minister of lands to conduct boundary surveys;210 nobles, 
however, have tended to resist surveys, as they are concerned about control 
over their estates.211  Past surveys came at the crown’s urging,212 so it seems 
likely that a new one would have to come at the king’s behest.  This would 
show where new allotments could be drawn.   
There may also be more open land in outer islands and other rural 
areas, but this land may not be as desirable because of problems such as 
poorer disaster preparedness.213  Recently, the Asia Development Bank, in 
conjunction with Australia’s AusAID, gave Tonga over 12 million U.S. 
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  This change has been suggested before in Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 138. 
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  The Land Act of 1988, § 7 (“Right to allotment”) (Tonga). 
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  See James, supra note 30, at 182. 
210
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dollars for infrastructure developments in Nuku‘alofa.214  But life in 
Nuku‘alofa is already desirable and relatively functional as its burgeoning 
population shows—perhaps a better plan would be to use some aid to 
develop less inhabited areas of Tonga in preparation for further allotments.  
A new cadastral survey could show whether there is productive land for 
allotment that would benefit from new infrastructure. 
Lastly, to increase the availability of land, the government could 
heavily tax or revoke allotments from Tongans living abroad who are not 
productively using their land.  This reform was proposed before, and 
commoners did not receive it well,215 perhaps because relatives of those 
living abroad use that unoccupied land.  The problem of inefficiently-used 
allotments highlights the difficulties that come with legally entitling people 
to property, though they do not necessarily deserve to appropriate land from 
nature.  Commoners who hold allotments but do not use them certainly seem 
to violate the Lockean proviso.216  The nobles cannot, therefore, be blamed 
for all of Tonga’s land issues, as this particular problem stems from Baker’s 
reforms—the Land Act does not require commoners to use their allotments 
productively, except for a provision that mandates that each allotment-holder 
plant 200 coconut trees or face a fine of up to fifty Tongan dollars (about 
twenty U.S. dollars).217   
To be fair to those who are using abandoned allotments productively, 
they could potentially apply for the allotment to be re-registered in their 
name.  The Land Court has stated that “ownership” of allotments can mean 
something more than simply a name on a deed, and thus the court may 
consider the labor that occupants have invested.218  This broader definition 
of ownership could inform possible statutory changes permitting those who 
are using the land to have the deed re-registered in their name.  This change 
should also lead to better environmental outcomes because commoners who 
use their relatives’ allotments may not have an incentive to use the land 
sustainably if they know their tenure is limited.219 
                                           
214
  Infrastructure Development in Tonga’s Capital to Get International Help, RADIO N.Z. INT’L., 
Nov. 5, 2011, http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php/index.php?op=read&id=63823. 
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  Maude & Sevele, supra note 35, at 140.  
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219
  See Stevens, supra note 32, at 164. 
MARCH 2012 LAND TENURE REFORM IN TONGA 357 
  
  
3. Tonga Should Create Land Laws and Policies that Allow Commoners 
to Capture the Capital Available in Their Lands 
 As noted above, better security in land rights should improve 
allotment productivity, and creating more allotments will appease more 
commoners who may be inclined to act out violently.  But the government 
could make other improvements by further amending the Land Act and the 
Constitution, as well as by encouraging changes in aid policies.  These 
changes would allow commoners to use their lands more productively.   
Whether or not Tonga becomes a freehold system, modifying the 
system of leases and mortgages will help commoners harness the capital in 
their allotments.  Commoners should be allowed to lease or mortgage both 
their tax and town allotments for whatever duration they see fit, without 
having to go through the government to do so.  Mortgages should also be 
allowed for the duration that commoners and the banks desire, without 
interference or need for approval from the government.  This will ensure that 
commoners can use their assets efficiently, improving life for commoners 
and reducing the likelihood of violent behavior.   
Any Constitutional or statutory provisions relating to leases and 
mortgages should be eliminated.  Two Constitutional provisions must be 
struck:  first, Clause 105 (“Terms of leases”), which requires cabinet 
approval for leases and restricts their length, and second, Clause 114 (“No 
lease etc. without consent”), which also requires cabinet or Privy Council 
approval for leases.220   
The Land Act regulates leases and mortgages extensively.  Section 56 
further restricts allotment leases to twenty years221 and should be removed.  
Further, Section 89 (“Consent of Cabinet”) reiterates the requirement of 
consent of the cabinet and should also be removed.222  Section 100 
(“Conditions of mortgage by allotment holder”) requires the minister of 
land’s approval for mortgages and limits the mortgage period to thirty 
years.223  This provision should be removed—as noted in Part II, banks are 
reluctant to make mortgages in which they may only foreclose on the 
                                           
220
  THE ACT OF CONSTITUTION OF TONGA (1988), cl. 105 (“Terms of leases”), cl. 114 (“No lease etc. 
without consent”).  The status of these clauses is unclear after other 2010 Constitutional amendments 
related to executive power.  See CEC FINAL REPORT, supra note 8, at 108. 
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  The Land Act of 1988, § 56 (“Tax or town allotment may be leased”) (Tonga).  Note that Section 
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222
  Id. at § 89 (“Consent of Cabinet”). 
223
  Id. at § 100 (“Conditions of mortgage by allotment holder”). 
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allotment for the balance of the thirty years.  Eliminating these restrictions 
will allow commoners to lease and mortgage their lands in their own best 
interests.  Interestingly, rents were previously determined by executive order, 
but later “His Majesty in Council ordered that the rental be such as is agreed 
between the parties.”224  Allowing the parties to set their rates indicates that 
the Privy Council may not be averse to allowing them to decide the length of 
their leases and mortgages as well.   
The above reforms on mortgages may not be effective if banks remain 
leery of loaning to commoners.  Tonga should encourage its many 
international development donors to provide credit to individual parties to 
improve their allotments, rather than to the Tongan government.  This 
approach requires that Tonga seriously consider the negative impact that 
foreign aid may be having on its economy.  Traditional development banking 
has been at its worst harmful to economic development, and at its best, 
inconsequential.225  As noted above, development aid could possibly be 
better used in preparing unoccupied areas of Tonga for allotment.  But a 
sounder approach may be to encourage foreign governments, such as 
Australia, to switch from development banking to community development 
banking (“CDB”).  CDB focuses on loaning to individuals, placed in small 
community or family groups, rather than to governments.226  It has not been 
successful everywhere, but success stories, including the famous 
Bangladeshi Grameen banks and banks in other communities “with 
relatively homogeneous and geographically immobile populations,”227 
provide some evidence that CDB would work in Tonga.  Successful CDB 
banking schemes share some common themes:  1) each loan is relatively 
small, 2) the villages participating are small, so monitoring of CDB 
members is easier, 3) family ties of participants are strong, and 4) rural 
laborers are not able to substitute their labor for urban work, thereby 
decreasing the chances for default.228  In Tonga, family ties are strong,229 and 
people are generally rural laborers who may have little possibility of labor 
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  Id. at § 57 (“Rentals”). 
225
  See generally WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN’S BURDEN: WHY THE WEST’S EFFORTS TO 
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substitution.230  Migration from Tonga could create default problems, but the 
decreasing ability of Tongans to migrate would make this less likely.  Tonga 
seems an ideal place to try CDB.  Donors really have nothing to lose—the 
Tongan government recently misplaced hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
New Zealand aid, a mishap that was later found to be an accounting error.231 
Other opportunities for change include reforming the inheritance 
system to allow allotment holders more freedom in deciding to whom to 
divest their allotment.  For example, women have no inheritance rights 
unless no male heir exists, and when there are no legally-prescribed heirs at 
all, the plot of land escheats to the noble estate-holder or to the 
government.232  Allowing the commoners more freedom in disposing of their 
allotments may encourage them to invest more in their land and to use more 
environmentally-sound agricultural practices for the benefit of their desired 
heirs.233  
4. Extensive Changes in the Tongan Political Structure May Be 
Necessary to Achieve Land Reforms 
The current government is unlikely to make changes in the land tenure 
system, but it would serve them well to do so.  In the past, land disputes 
were decided with war, and the possibility of large-scale commoner violence 
may no longer be so remote.  Without some change, commoners will be 
likely to act aggressively and may endanger nobles and their property.   
However, some kind of further political change is probably necessary 
to reform the land tenure system.234  Currently, commoners are calling for a 
Constitutional amendment that would allow them to elect the noble members 
as well as the people’s members.235  This may be a good compromise 
position for now—nobles would still hold power, but would have to compete 
to garner commoner support. 
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More political representation may help commoners pass amendments 
related to land.  The Constitution can be amended according to Clause 79, 
which allows the Legislative Assembly to discuss amendments not related to 
succession of the throne and the estates and titles of nobles.236  The 
Legislative Assembly must pass the amendment three times, and the Privy 
Council and cabinet must be unanimously in favor of the amendment, at 
which point the king can assent to the amendment and sign it into law.237  
While Clause 79 seems to give commoner representatives a lot of hoops to 
jump through, the Privy Council and cabinet did agree to the recent 
amendments with public pressure.  As noted above, however, any 
amendments related to land tenure may be much more difficult to pass,238 
and whether Clause 79 would outlaw discussion of the proposed 
Constitutional amendments is another issue.  Clause 79 may effectively 
constrain land tenure reform to the bounds of the Land Act.  
Though Constitutional or statutory reforms are necessary to secure 
commoner land rights, they are not sufficient.  To ensure commoners can 
enforce their rights, the court system must be modified.  The Land Court, 
made up of judges and assessors appointed by the king, and the Privy 
Council, which hears appeals,239 may not be sympathetic to the claims of 
commoners.  To remedy this, the Land Court should include commoners, or 
at the very least, its decisions should be appealable only to the supreme court 
and court of appeal, which have recently handed down quite pro-commoner 
decisions.240  Unfortunately, the king has recently taken steps to regain 
control of the judiciary by controlling appointments, which an independent 
commission had previously made,241 so it is unclear how pro-commoner the 
supreme court and court of appeal will remain. 
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5. “Culture” Should Not Come Before Commoner Rights and National 
Stability 
 A common counterargument to significant land reform in Tonga is that 
the land tenure system, including the traditional role of the nobles, is an 
essential part of Tongan culture and must be protected.  There are indications 
that commoners are angry with the king and the nobles, and that they find 
the “cultural” requirement to defer to them to be burdensome or unsavory.  
On an internet discussion forum called the “Kavabowl,” Tongans discuss 
political issues in their country and are free to comment on the social 
hierarchy that exists there.242  One Tongan commented:  “values and 
moralities are being exploited, in political terms, by the authorities to 
maintain the status quo in the name of a monster so called ‘Tradition’ (the 
idyllic and romanticized past).”243  In another post, a member wrote a poem 
that concluded:  “It was not the nobles with their greedy and grand old 
ploys/Who gave us freedom that our little island now enjoys.”244  Such 
displays of commoner disrespect toward nobles are not rare.245  In any case, 
if such a cultural norm does exist, Tongans must still decide if it is worth 
more than equality. 
 One anthropologist noted the tension between the commoners’ 
obligations to culture and the pursuit of their freedoms: 
I concluded that the demand had originated from the noble 
himself . . . .  The feast demand occurred when commoner 
parliament members were spearheading a movement for 
democratization . . . .  Coincidentally, in another village close to 
where I worked, commoners had recently refused to use their 
own resources to provide their noble with a demanded feast.246 
Commoners must decide whether it is worth enduring these demands in the 
name of culture.  The pro-democracy movement, the 2006 riots, and the 
recent Constitutional amendments indicate that commoners are beginning to 
place their rights and freedoms ahead of culture.  This comment suggests 
legal and policy strategies for formally prioritizing individual liberties over 
tradition. 
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Tonga’s ancient hierarchy was largely enshrined in the 1875 
Constitution and the 1882 Land Act.  The election of 2010 under the 
“ordinary peoples’ Constitution,” allowing for increased commoner 
representation, has created a government unlikely to reform land laws and 
policies in favor of commoners.  However, the laws must change if the 
government wishes to quell violent political protests, as people will continue 
to be motivated to fight for increased access and control of land.  This 
comment offers solutions in the form of changes to the Constitution and the 
Land Act, and new land policies, which would decrease noble control of 
commoner lands, open up more lands for allotment, and help make 
commoner lands more productive. 
The CEC’s first report on Constitutional changes cautioned that the 
pro-democracy movement should be balanced by considering ancient 
Tongan culture.247  Yet, Tongans themselves, both nobles and commoners, 
must decide whether “cultural preservation” is more important than equality 
in land and political rights and thus more important than their country’s 
stability. 
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